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Encountering Amateurism: John Henry




This article explores the productive uses of amateurism in comparative law through
a close reading of the life and work of John Henry Wigmore, the founder of the
American tradition of comparative law who first came to the subject as a young
missionary for the Langdellian style of American legal education in turn-of-the-
century Japan. Drawing on anthropological and linguistic theory, the article ex-
plains amateurism as a post-Realist epithet for formalism. It seeks to counter
the received view of the discipline as a pure product of American and European
critiques of legal classicism by demonstrating how Wigmore’s turn to the perfor-
mative dimensions of legal formalism, at a moment when formalism found itself
under Realist attack, provided a sustaining vision of the discipline. The power and
creativity of formalist performance, as well as its limitations and even dangers, as
deployed by Wigmore, raise questions relevant beyond comparative law about the
aesthetic dimensions of American formalism.
1Chapter 5
Encountering Amateurism:
John Henry Wigmore and the Uses of American Formalism
Annelise Riles*
One of the recurring complaints about comparative law is that it is
amateuristic. It is not a new complaint. For decades, now, the same critiques
have been heard and still, the old methods--and the old critiques--persist.
Amateurism within the academy is always met with a certain degree of
unease. One common explanation presents amateurism, like popularism, as the
effect of another era with its own problems and paradigms. Amateurism, in
this view, is a feature of the pre-modernist past.1 The persistence of
                                                
* I am grateful to Jane Campion, Aaron Kirk and Beth Olds for archival
research, and to Joann Thompson for help in preparing the manuscript. I thank
Hitoshi Aoki, Juro Iwatani, David Kennedy, Hiro Miyazaki, William Novak,
Mathias Reimann for many helpful comments on this paper.
1 In this view, what looks to us now as amateuristic scholarship was in
fact scholarship tailored for the evolutionary ideas that dominated the academy
prior to the introduction of modernist social scientific paradigms. See, e.g.,
Marilyn Strathern, Out of Context: The Persuasive Fictions of Anthropology,
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2amateurism in late twentieth century comparative law, long after the infusion
of modern social scientific paradigms and methods into other fields of legal
scholarship, then, is treated as something of an embarrassment. And yet,
alongside other disciplines specializing in comparison from anthropology to
comparative literature, amateurism is perhaps comparative law’s defining
methodological trait.
This essay began with a quite naïve professionalizing ambition for our
amateuristic discipline and an equally naïve interest in one of our discipline’s
greatest promoters, John Henry Wigmore. Intrigued by Wigmore’s three-year
stay in Japan and of his work toward the translation and editing of Tokugawa
Era2 statutes and case law, I was interested to learn how a young legal scholar
encountered a society which, in his own understanding, was entirely foreign to
him, and how the experience might have shaped his work as a comparativist.
One of the dogmas of modern relativism is that the encounter with difference
through the extended experience of a distant society and its legal system
                                                                                                                               
28 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 251 (1987). For my own views on modernism in
comparative law, see Annelise Riles, Wigmore’s Treasure Box: Comparative
Law in the Era of Information, 40 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 221 (1999).
2 The Tokugawa Era (properly called the Edo Period, 1603 - 1867) refers
to the period during which Japan, ruled by the Tokugawa family, was closed
to outside influences.
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3changes the person as well as the scholar; that the personal experience of
difference directs and refocuses the theoretical project. From this standpoint,
Wigmore’s extended stay in a non-European country where he learned the
language and engaged in serious long-term research might have provided a
model from within the tradition for a more rigorous, less amateuristic,
comparative law.
However, an inquiry into Wigmore’s encounter with Japanese
“custom” complicates the familiar trope of the scholar changed by travel to
distant places and the encounter with things strange and foreign there. Not
only did Wigmore emerge from his sojourn in Japan with most of the same
views with which he began, but there was much that I found troubling about
both the content and the genre in which those views found expression. I came
to accept that Wigmore was an ordinary person and scholar, very much a
product of his time and social milieu, with some extraordinary abilities,
interests and commitments--we might call them professional hobbies--who
produced some scattered but remarkable achievements. More importantly, I
came to accept the necessity of rethinking my own ideas about amateurism
and related professionalizing ambitions.
John Henry Wigmore, Professor and later Dean of Northwestern
University School of Law, was the quintessential establishment figure, and he
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
4worked hard at it. He was the sort of dean who was adored by alumni,3 the sort
of scholar whose ideal audience was the local bar association, a man who
belonged to every club and society, and who meticulously clipped every
reference to his activities in the most trivial of newsletters.4 Although he has
been called the father of American comparative law for his work in
introducing the discipline to the American academy,5 his work is rarely read
today. In his time, as in retrospect, he was regarded as an eclectic, free-
thinking, exceptionally energetic but somewhat distracted scholar whose
                                                
3 The Northwestern Alumni newsletter records an instance in which 400
alumni gathered, and banged on tables as they sang,
Oh! Wigmore, Dean Wigmore,
You’re a leader who is tried and true,
Oh! Wigmore, Dean Wigmore,
Old Northwestern Should Be Proud Of You.
John H. Wigmore Honored by “World,” ALUMNI NEWS, NORTHWESTERN
UNIVERSITY (January 1930).
4 See, e.g., Colonel Wigmore Honored by Japan, THE DISCUS, Dec. 1935.
(On file at Northwestern University Library).
5 JEROME HALL, COMPARATIVE LAW AND SOCIAL THEORY 10 (1963).
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5contribution lay more in his popularization of comparative and foreign law
than in the formulation of new paradigms or ideas.6
                                                
6 The reviewer of Wigmore’s Panorama of the World’s Legal Systems
for the Yale Law Journal, for example, wrote:
If Dean Wigmore’s primary aim is to give the general reader a
series of interesting, but necessarily rapid and incomplete,
pictures of the historical development of the sixteen legal
systems of the world then he has undoubtedly been successful.
Beautifully printed on excellent paper and enlivened by over
five hundred illustrations the books are a pleasure to the eye.
These “impressionistic” sketches, full of pleasant gossipy bits
and occasional good stories, are particularly easy reading for
they do not attempt to deal with any general ideas or principles.
. . . . If, however, this work is intended as an introduction to the
subject of comparative law, then we are doubtful whether it
will accomplish its purpose. . . . After having enjoyed the
elaborately colored illustrations of the Great Pyramid, the
Hanging Gardens of Babylon, the Parthenon, and the Colossus
at Rhodes, it may seem ungracious on the part of the reviewer
to disagree with Dean Wigmore’s view that the pictorial
method is of practical value in expounding the science of the
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
6\insert figure 1 here\
Wigmore’s personal blend of idealism and complacency in his life and
scholarship might serve as an apt metaphor for the character of our discipline.
In his own time, Wigmore’s personal views seemed at once revolutionary and
reactionary. He was nominated to the World Court for his rare familiarity with
foreign law and his visionary commitment to international institutions, but his
nomination was later derailed because of his hostility to pacifists and leftists
during World War I.7 He took strong public stances on controversial issues,
                                                                                                                               
law. A student whose zeal must be stimulated in this way, can
hardly be worth teaching.
A. L. Goodhart, Book Review, 38 YALE L.J. 554, 554-55 (1929). See also
Theodore Pluckett, Book Review, 42 HARV. L. REV. 587 (1929).
7 For an example of this hostility, see John H. Wigmore, J.H. Wigmore
Answers Frankfurter Attack on Sacco-Vanzetti Verdict: A Fair Trial-Facts as
Well as Law Reviewed by Supreme Court, BOSTON EVENING TRANSCRIPT,
April 25, 1927; Felix Frankfurter, Prof. Frankfurter Replies to Dean Wigmore,
THE BOSTON EVENING TRANSCRIPT, April 26, 1927; John H. Wigmore,
Editorial, THE BOSTON HERALD, May 10, 1927; Felix Frankfurter, Mr.
Frankfurter’s Reply, THE BOSTON HERALD, May 11, 1927. Roscoe Pound
described Wigmore’s attack on Frankfurter in this exchange as “a disgrace to
legal scholarship.” DAVID WIGDOR, ROSCOE POUND: PHILOSPHER OF LAW 250
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7and yet he knew how to cut himself off from an unpopular position when
necessary.8 In his letter in support of Wigmore’s candidacy for the World
Court, Benjamin Cardozo put it in flattering but double-edged terms: “He has
                                                                                                                               
(1974). Likewise, Wigmore’s approach to the testimony of sexual assault
victims in his writings on evidence has been the subject of much-deserved
feminist critique. See Leigh B. Bienen, A Question of Credibility: John Henry
Wigmore’s Use of Scientific Authority in Section 924a of the Treatise on
Evidence, 19 CAL. W. L. REV. 235, 237 (1983) (“Under the guise of arguing
on the basis of objective, scientific authority, this section of Wigmore’s
treatise simply states that all females who allege sexual assault should be
assumed to be lying, a repressive and misogynist position.”)
8 Consider, for example, Wigmore’s stance toward Japan at the outbreak
of World War II:
John H. Wigmore, dean emeritus of Northwestern University
Law School, who spent three years in Japan, was compiling a
translation of international law for the Japanese government
when the Pearl Harbor attack was made. He says the Japs pay
no attention to laws, national or international.
News Brief, MOMENCE, ILL. PROGRESS REPORTER, March 12, 1943.
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8attained an eminence that would make him lonely, if he were not so obviously
human.”9
Throughout his career, Wigmore enthusiastically, even didactically
promoted the comparative method in legal education. With funds raised from
local industrialists, he traveled the world collecting legal materials10 and
                                                
9 Benjamin Cardozo, Statement regarding Wigmore’s Nomination to the
Court of International Justice (1930) (on file at Northwestern University
Library, Box 1)
10 Consider, for example, the following summer travel schedule:
Route of tickets: 1st cl. steamer, 2nd cl. rail; beginning at
Liverpool, thence by Harwich to Rotterdam, thence by rail
Amsterdam, Enkhuizen, and Bremen to Kiel; thence by steamer
& rail to Kopenhagen; thence by rail & steamer via Malmo,
Sassnitz, Stralsund, Greifswald to Berlin; thence via Dresden,
to Prag; thence to Krakau; thence via Waag Valley to Buda-
Pest; thence to Vienna; thence via Linz to Salzburg; thence via
Strassburg, Luxembourg, Namur, to Brussels; thence via
Antwerp to Rotterdam; thence via Harwich, London, Oxford,
Hereford to Liverpool.
John H. Wigmore, Summer Schedule: June 12 to August 30, 1905 (on
file at Northwestern University Library Archives, Box 12).
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art39
9covered the walls of the law school with pictures of scenes of courtrooms and
the world.11 He corresponded with comparativists from around the world, and
his translation and publication of the works of foreign jurists for an American
audience is one of his great ignored legacies.12 He played a key role in the
                                                
11 Cf. Riles, Wigmore’s Treasure Box, supra note 1.
12 The scale of this project was truly astounding. Wigmore’s Continental
Legal History Series and Criminal Science Series translated and published the
works of French scholars Jean Brissaud, Joseph Charmont, Paul Collinet,
René Demogue, Léon Duguit, Adhémar Esmein, Alfred Fouillée, Eugène
Gaudemet, René Garraud, François Geny, Paul Frédéric Girard, Édouard
Lambert, Georges Ripert, Raymond Saleilles, and Gabriel de Tarde; German
scholars Fritz Berolzheimer, Heinrich Brunner, Arthur Engelmann, Heinrich
Gerland, Andreas Heusler, Rudolf Hübner, Carl Koehne, Josef Kohler,
Burkhard Wilhelm Leist, Adolf Merkel, Richard Schroeder, Heinrich Siegel,
Rudolf Stammler, Roderich von Stintzing, Otto Stobbe, Ludwig von Bar,
Rudolf von Jhering, and Heinrich Zoepfl; Italian scholars Carlo Calisse,
Giorgio Del Vecchio, Enrico Ferri, Cesare Lombroso, Achille Loria, Luigi
Miraglia, Alfred Rocco, Michele Angelo Vaccaro and Icilio Vanni, and many
others from Latin America, China, Japan, Eastern, and Northern Europe. See
generally CONTINENTAL LEGAL HISTORY SERIES and CRIMINAL SCIENCE
SERIES. See also Sarah Morgan, Memorial Proposing Dean John H. Wigmore
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
10
organization and promotion of the International Congresses of Comparative
Law of 1932 and 1937.13 It was rumored that he even maintained a Shinto
shrine in his suburban living room.
By Wigmore’s own admission, however, during his most ambitious
years as professor and then as dean, comparative law remained primarily a
hobby—perhaps of the same order as the musical comedy routines and
rhymed mottoes he wrote for the school,14 or his summer holiday travels.
Crucially to the future of comparative law in the United States, he left no
                                                                                                                               
of Northwestern University (Chicago) for the Permanent Court of
International Justice 1930 (on file at Northwestern University, Box 10).
13 See generally John H. Wigmore, Report of Committee of Conference
of State Bar Delegates on 1932 International Congress of Comparative Law,
18 ABA J. 37 (1932); John H. Wigmore, The Congress of Comparative Law,
23 ABA J. 75 (1937). “Where most of the American lawyers had never been
to Europe, they were amazed to discover that Wigmore already knew all the
leading European comparativists and spoke to them in their own languages.”
William R. Roalfe, John Henry Wigmore: Scholar and Reformer, 53 J. OF
CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY AND POL. SCI. 277, 296 (1962).
14 Wigmore’s musical compositions are on file at the Northwestern
University Library, Boxes 230-31.
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disciples.15 Wigmore rather made his scholarly name as an expert in the field
of evidence, and his serious and still-popular treatise is a standard performance
in that formalist genre that makes only subtle nods to the virtues of
comparativism.16 During this period, he also devoted great efforts to building
the law school and solidifying personal and institutional ties to the local bar
associations, and in these tasks he proved to be a shrewd and popular
politician.17
What is perhaps most difficult to come to terms with is Wigmore’s
dogged amateurism. The mature Wigmore’s “pictorial method” of
                                                
15 See Pierre LeGrand, John Henry Merryman and Comparative Legal
Studies: A Dialogue, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 3, 6 (1999).
16 See JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW (1904). For examples of the enduring relevance
of Wigmore’s treatise, see, e.g., TERANCE ANDERSON & WILLIAM TWINING,
HOW TO DO THINGS WITH FACTS BASED ON WIGMORE’S SCIENCE OF
JURIDICAL PROOF (1991); Paul Bergman, Of Bentham, Wigmore, and Little Bo
Peep: Where Evidence Lost its Way, and a Map for Scholars to Find it, 66
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 949 (1991);
17 See WILLIAM R. ROALFE, JOHN HENRY WIGMORE 105 (1977).
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comparative law,18 in which stories and images, authentic or not, were
collected together into popular volumes and “entertaining” presentations,
seems quixotic to the point of absurdity. How are we to reconcile the self-
image of the serious young scientist, bringing the “science” of Langdellian
legal education and its formalist precepts to the periphery of civilization and
returning with “data” about strange foreign customs, with the eccentric
presentations of the older scholar? Wigmore’s encounter with the Orient and
later with the academy, therefore, will serve as an example of the place of
amateurism in comparative legal method—that side of comparative
scholarship that, as in Wigmore’s life, postdates and somehow survives the
best justifications for the adventure.
Of course, this kind of amateurism, a certain studied eccentricity at the
level of self and scholarly presentation, is rare in comparative law. But
Wigmore’s treatment of non-Western legal culture as a source of information
about modern law’s evolutionary past is more common. The critique that this
paradigm inspires from scholars outside the discipline finds some echoes in
comparativists’ own complaints about the vacuousness of their analytical
categories, the casual way in which data is made to fit arguments about the
transplantation of legal systems from one society to another, or the lack of
                                                
18 For a further discussion of Wigmore’s pictorial method, see generally
Riles, supra note 1.
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commitment to the societies they describe or interest in the messiness of
detail.
Since the critique of the amateurism of adherence to outdated
paradigms has already been laid out eloquently,19 this critique will not be the
goal of this essay. Let me be more plain: in the vocabulary of this essay,
amateurism is not to be taken as a disparaging word. Rather, my interest is in
the features of what critics call amateurism, its internal purposes and
rationales.
What was the relationship, then, between professional work and
hobby? Did the Treatise on Evidence occupy an entirely different world for
Wigmore from his comparative interests? I do not think so. Rather, I want to
suggest that we read Wigmore’s approach to comparison as one enactment of
the mainstream American approaches to legal thought we term legal
formalism. What I have in mind here, however, is not the doctrinal,
epistemological or logical dimensions of formalism often discussed by its
realist and postrealist critics20 but rather its performative, and relational
dimensions.21
                                                
19 See, e.g., LeGrand, supra note 15; Symposium: New Directions in
Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 597 (1998).
20 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of
Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
14
One can begin by taking a cue from Wigmore himself: The trail of
scholarship and correspondence Wigmore left behind suggests that the
comparativistÕs life project¾ Wigmore, the Institution, as one colleague
memorialized him22¾ hardly began and ended with the four corners of the
scholarly text.
#
Ambition in Lotus Land
#
The origins of Wigmore’s interest in comparative law are succinctly retold by
Wigmore himself:
                                                                                                                               
1940, 3 RESEARCH IN LAW & SOCIOLOGY (Steven Spitzer ed.) (1980); Cass
Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COL. L. REV. 873 (1987); DUNCAN KENNEDY,
A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION [FIN DE SIECLE] (1997); Fred Schauer,
Formalism, 97 YALE L.J., 509 (1988).
21 My aim here is to bring thinking about legal formalism into
conversation with broader debates about the performative dimensions of form.
See, e.g., Hirokazu Miyazaki, Faith and its Fulfillment: Agency, Exchange and
the Fijian Aesthetics of Completion, 27 AM. ETHNOL. 31(2000); ANNELISE
RILES, THE NETWORK INSIDE OUT (2000).
22 Albert Kocourek, John Henry Wigmore: A Personal Portrait, 24 THE
GREEN BAG 2, 8 (1912).
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art39
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At [the time of my studies] the subject of comparative law was
not studied at Harvard, except in James Barr Ames’ personal
researches, omnivorously sympathetic as he was with all
aspects of law.…In Japan, the comparative point of view
naturally emerged. At that time, as today in China, the new
Occidental legislation was occupying all thoughts of the
Japanese people, including the students, and no interest was
shown in their own native institutions. This then seemed
strange to me. …I was able to discover a great mass of
recorded materials showing their indigenous development...and
hoped on returning to the United States to become a professor
of Comparative Law. But President Eliot [of Harvard
University] pointed out to me that there was no American
interest in that subject, and no opening for it in law schools. In
fact, most of the material which I used for my essay in the
Harvard Law Review in 1897 on The Pledge Idea, a Study in
Comparative Legal Ideas, was found in the great Library of the
College and not in the Library of the Law School of that
period.23
                                                
23John H. Wigmore, Comparative Law: Jottings on Comparative Legal
Ideas and Institutions, 6 TULANE L. REV. 48, 48-53 (1931).
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Wigmore’s irrepressible excitement about his project, and his resigned
bitterness about its marginality in the academy will be familiar to many
comparativists today.
In 1889, as a recent graduate of the Harvard Law School, Wigmore
sailed to Japan to help establish the Keio Law School on the Langdellian
model.24 In Japan, it was a time of “Westernization” in which everything
Japanese was to be discarded for things foreign, and Wigmore’s work was a
small part of this project. Wigmore’s letters, diaries, newspaper articles and
scholarly writings from his three years in Japan are those of an intelligent,
ambitious, but otherwise ordinary law graduate, eager to make some
“scientific” use of his time in a far away place, but undistinguished in his
general outlook from other expatriates of that time. Like most of his fellow
citizens, Wigmore believed that the West, as “Japan’s adopted parent,” had
much to teach, and that the Rule of Law should be first among these lessons.
Wigmore was among the second generation of foreigners hired by the
Meiji government—so-called “yatoi” (foreign menials) brought in after 1866
to Westernize all aspects of Japanese society.25 Legal reform was at the top of
                                                
24 Keio University is the oldest private university in Japan and one of its
most prestigious.
25 See generally H.J. JONES, LIVE MACHINES (1980); ARDATH W. BURKS,
THE MODERNIZERS: OVERSEAS STUDENTS, FOREIGN EMPLOYEES, AND MEIJI
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art39
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the government’s agenda as part of its bid to satisfy Western nations’
conditions for the cession of extraterritorial jurisdiction over their nationals in
Japan¾ a cause of deep humiliation to Japanese elites.26 The first generation of
foreign scholars had translated Western laws and jurisprudence and drafted the
new civil codes, but by the time of Wigmore’s arrival, that more momentous
work was already coming to a close. 27 Wigmore’s role, rather, was to be the
                                                                                                                               
JAPAN (1983); NEIL PEDLAR, THE IMPORTED PIONEERS: WESTERNERS WHO
HELPED BUILD MODERN JAPAN (1990). Wigmore was the “foreign menial” of
Yukichi Fukuzawa, an academic and educator, and the now mythical founder
of the private Keio University. Fukuzawa’s picture appears on the 10,000 yen
note today.
26 Wigmore himself was ardently against extraterritorial jurisdiction and
wrote a number of editorials and academic articles in Japan and the United
States on the subject. See, e.g., John H. Wigmore, Foreign Jurisdiction in
Japan, THE NEW YORK NATION, Jan. 12, 1893; John H. Wigmore, Carstens
and Exterritoriality, THE JAPAN DAILY MAIL, Nov. 8, 1892; John H. Wigmore,
Code Translations, THE JAPAN DAILY MAIL, Nov. 14, 1892; John H.
Wigmore, Throwing Stones from Glass Houses, THE JAPAN DAILY MAIL,
September 2, 1891.
27 Key figures in this work included the American Erastus Peshine
Smith, who worked for the Japanese Foreign Ministry as an advisor on
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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training of the next generation of Japanese lawyers—and hence he was free to
turn to less applied and more scholarly forms of inquiry.
The nostalgia in Wigmore’s turn to Japanese customary law, after the
modernizing ambitions of codification were largely spent, was no doubt
shaped by the commitments of his predecessors. The earlier generation of
yatoi had come to see their role as one of preserving the true Japanese
character from the desire to destroy all things indigenous in favor of Western
trends¾ as protecting Japan against itself.28 Upon his arrival in Japan,
                                                                                                                               
international law from 1871, the Frenchman Georges Bousquet, who
established a School of French Law within the Ministry of Justice in 1872, and
most importantly, Emile Gustav Boissonade of the Faculty of Law of the
University of Paris, who over a period of more than twenty years drafted the
Japanese Civil Code on property, the Penal Code, and the Code of Criminal
Procedure. See PEDLAR, THE IMPORTED PIONEERS, supra note 25 at 187-8.
28 Jones comments of Bousquet that
[the] motivation for the feverish activity he assessed as vanity,
an attempt to show Europe a décor of Western civilization . . .
Bousquet felt their efforts too grand, too ostentatious, not in
keeping with indigenous qualities. This assessment represents a
fair consensus of opinion among yatoi. . . .
JONES, supra note 25 at 15.
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art39
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Wigmore received the following counsel from H.B. Adams, President of Johns
Hopkins University, who had encouraged him to take the position:
I think the duty of American Educators in Japan should be to
cultivate greater stability of character and judgement in the
Japanese youth and to preserve a consciousness of historic
continuity in the institutions and culture of the Japanese people.
The introduction of the historic method of studying law,
politics and religion would be the salvation of that
revolutionary and iconoclastic race. . . . I believe you could
render a substantial service to New Japan by Historical
investigations into the social and legal History of Old Japan.29
These academic and political motivations served only as background
and pretext, however, 30 for a very fantastical adventure. Wigmore’s first letter
home captures his mood:
                                                
29 Letter from H.B. Adams, President of Johns Hopkins University, to
John H. Wigmore (October 28, 1889) (on file at Northwestern University
Library, Box 18).
30 Wigmore wrote to his mother-in-law en route to Japan that
[t]he only thing about the coming tasks that has the slightest
burden about it looking forward from now is the work of the
lectures, but I am not much apprehensive even about this, for I
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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[T]he sail up the bay to Yokohama was like a sail into
fairyland. The mountains on either hand were like curious bits
of stage scenery, fantastic shapes and picturesque effect of light
and shade. The volcano of Oshima could be seen on the left
with a crest of smoke, and after the sun had risen, Fujiyama, the
great snow-crowned mountain, came into sight far more
majestic and beautiful than we had ever imagined. Soon we
passed close to the shore, and the little coves, green sward, and
fairy trees made one and all of us feel over and over again that
it was a journey into fairy land. In the distance the white and
yellow bluffs showed in the sun, and all the hills came close to
the water’s edge. About us were little fairy boats, like
cockleshells or walnut boats...It [Yokohama] is the most
picturesque looking town I have ever seen ...[The natives with]
their shock of black hair, usually carefully parted, with their
olive complexions, white teeth, and intelligent earnest looks
make them very fascinating. The whole affair seemed like a
                                                                                                                               
am told positively that no one works hard in Japan, no matter
who he is.
Letter from John Henry Wigmore to Mrs. Vogl (October 20, 1889) (on
file with the author).
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art39
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play, from the ship to the hotel. There we found European life
again.31
For a young lawyer who had struggled to find enough employment to
feed himself in Boston, part of the excitement stemmed from his newfound
status and relevance. His wife Emma wrote of Wigmore’s reaction to the
crowd of students that greeted them at the train:
The dear boy was of course unconscious as ever of his own
self, and thought only of the mass of youthful faces about him,
and set them almost wild by waving his hat and I don’t know
but that he joined in their cheering.32
The privileges of his colonial status, likewise, were avidly consumed in the
register of fantasy and amusement:
[W]e took our first ride in the jinrikishas. We are all delighted
with that way of travelling. The men seem so interested in you
                                                
31 Letter from John Henry Wigmore to Mrs. Vogl. (October 24, 1889) (on
file at Northwestern University Library, Box 179).
32 Letter from Emma Wigmore to Mrs. Vogl. (October 27, 1889) (on file
at Northwestern University Library, Box 179).
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and are so intelligent that it is like playing, not like sober life at
all.33
In joining the expatriate community of Japan, Harry and Emma suddenly
found access to a social and political circle far beyond their means.34 This
suited Wigmore’s ambitions well:
What do you think of all the high-and-mightiness in which we
have reveled this week? Think of being specially invited to a
tea at the British Minister’s! Think of inviting Sir Edwin
Arnold to dinner and still more, think of him accepting it!35
                                                
33 Letter from John H. Wigmore to Mrs. Vogl. (Oct. 24, 1889) (on file at
Northwestern University Library, Box 179).
34 Harry and Emma Wigmore’s letters and diaries from this period give
the picture of a couple with few financial resources struggling to save. They
emphasize that they shop at length for every household item; they share a
home with another teacher and his wife; they sleep under a cotton comforter
rather than a silk one and that Emma wears the same dress to every ball.
35 Letter from John Henry Wigmore to Mrs. Vogl. (November 12, 1889)
(on file at Northwestern University Library, Box 179). Something of their




Wigmore threw himself into the experience of the expatriate scholar.
He studied the Japanese language and read every book and article about
Japanese legal institutions he could find. He learned Japanese fencing. He
played shortstop on Tokyo’s first baseball team.36 Emma wrote that “this trip
to Japan seems to be bringing out many strong points which [Harry] never
knew he possessed.”37
\insert figure 2 here\
Part of the excitement of Japan was the intellectual freedom Wigmore
suddenly gained to stray beyond usual disciplinary confines.38 He wrote
                                                                                                                               
In the next mail will you please send me ‘Social Etiquette’ and
‘The Correct Thing’, three hair nets for my bangs, and I wish
you could spare me one of your cook books. … Harry would
like to have you send him 1) all of his newspaper cuttings [and]
2) his printed articles.
Letter from Emma Wigmore to Edith Vogl (November 22, 1889) (on file
at Northwestern University Library).
36 ROALFE, supra note 17 at 22-24.
37 Letter from Emma Wigmore to Mrs. Vogl (February 3, 1890) (on file at
Northwestern University Library).
38 Jones comments that for many yatoi, who were in their mid-twenties,
Japan afforded an opportunity to explore ideas and projects that were not
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articles for Scribner’s and The Nation on topics as distant from law as the
architecture of the new parliament building and the latest fashions in dress.39
He traveled to the countryside to witness elections. He held “interviews” with
prominent Japanese intellectuals. He reviewed books on flower arranging and
dissertations on Japanese history, and collected ethnographic information
about festival preparations.
In particular, Wigmore was to find his niche among the members of
the Asiatic Society, an institution in many expatriate communities in
nineteenth century Asia. Here was amateurism at its zenith. Devoted to the
study of local “custom,” the Society sponsored talks and published papers
                                                                                                                               
completely acceptable in the West. A notable example is Edward Morse’s
work on human evolution and biological anthropology at a time when the
subject was highly controversial in the United States. See JONES, supra note 25
at 74-75; cf. D. ELEANOR WESTNEY, IMITATION AND INNOVATION: THE
TRANSFER OF WESTERN ORGANIZATIONAL PATTERNS TO MEIJI JAPAN (1987).
39 John H. Wigmore, Starting a Parliament in Japan, SCRIBNER’S
MAGAZINE, JULY 1891, at 33-50; John H. Wigmore, Parliamentary Days in
Japan, SCRIBNER’S MAGAZINE, Aug. 1891, at 243-55.
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art39
25
about Japanese history and ethnology.40 Under Wigmore’s direction, its
Committee on Ethnography collected information on customary land tenure by
way of a questionnaire distributed to local elites.41
                                                
40 The Asiatic Society of Japan still exists today as a club of amateur
ethnologists under the titular leadership of a minor member of the Japanese
royal family.
41 In connection with this work, Wigmore wrote
The plan adopted, we may add, is not a novel one by any
means. Only a year or two ago the China Branch of the Asiatic
Society sent out a few questions in the same way and upon the
same topic; and very gratifying results were obtained. The
Ethnological Society of Great Britain has for some years
worked in the same way in investigating the sociology of the
southern hemisphere. Perhaps the most systematic undertaking
of this sort is that of the United States Bureau of Ethnology,
which publishes a book containing several thousand questions,
for linguistic investigators among the American Indians. …it is
impossible to study local institutions aright without giving to
folk-lore, superstitions, ceremonies, festivals, and such facts a
more important place than hitherto.
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The conversion of adventure into academic project began with
Wigmore’s discovery of the dusty reports of a Ministry of Justice commission
on informal dispute resolution and customary law convened twenty years
prior, and shortly after the purposeful obliteration of those customary practices
by the Meiji government as part of its modernization drive.42 Wigmore raised
funds from the Asiatic Society and assembled a team of translators to edit an
English language abridged version of the records of what he poetically called
“Justice in Old Japan”. He published the first four volumes of materials in
1892.43
It was in the course of this adventure, then, that Wigmore invented
himself as a comparative legal scholar. The new science of comparative law
provided a rationale for what otherwise must have seemed like an odd hobby.
                                                                                                                               
John H. Wigmore, The Asiatic Society’s Questions, THE JAPAN DAILY
MAIL, Aug. 13, 1891.
42 JOHN H. WIGMORE, LAW AND JUSTICE IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN xiv (1969)
(hereinafter, “LAW AND JUSTICE”).
43 John Henry Wigmore Re-Visits Japan, THE ALUMNI NEWS (1935). The
Japan Cultural Society (Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai) resumed the project in
1967 under the direction of Dr. Takayanagi Kenzo, a law professor at the
University of Tokyo, with funding from the Japanese government. See
WIGMORE, LAW AND JUSTICE, supra note 42 at xi.
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Wigmore imagined this hobby as a potential ticket to a teaching position in an
American law school upon his return and in his correspondence with Holmes,
Brandeis and other legal theorists back home, Wigmore positioned himself as
a diligent foot soldier in the often thankless work of mapping out the
evolutionary structure of law and of cataloguing its variations.44
On the ground, however, the work was considerably less lofty.
Wigmore claimed to speak fluent Japanese and he certainly had learned some
technical legal terminology, but he did not read or write. He was dependent,
then, on a team of young Japanese academics.45 The correspondence suggests
a cagey set of potentially exploitative relationships in which both sides
jockeyed for advantage with their eyes on the project’s implications for their
personal advancement:
                                                
44 See, e.g., John H. Wigmore, Letter to Oliver Wendell Holmes, March
30, 1891 (sending materials on land tenure customs in Japan and informing
Holmes that he plans to write a treatise on “native Japanese law”).
45 See Letter from John Henry Wigmore to Mr. Karusu (Chairman of the
Society for International Cultural Relations) (1935) (on file at Northwestern
University Library).




I am sorry that I can not do the work for you, for the




Although during the course of this work, Wigmore clearly developed
respect for his Japanese colleagues and for Japan more generally, it must be
acknowledged that the inquiry into Japanese legal custom and the experience
of collaborating with Japanese scholars ultimately did not shake the
foundations of his own beliefs in the way a late modern comparativist might
hope it would have done. One of the more interesting examples of the limits of
Wigmore’s own relativism concerns his own outrage over the treatment of
Japanese immigrants in the United States. During his time in Japan and
throughout his life, Wigmore spoke and wrote extensively about the injustice
                                                
46 Letter from Matsumo to John Henry Wigmore (July 17, 1890) (on file
at Northwestern University Library).
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of American immigration policies.47 Just prior to the outbreak of World War
II, he wrote that the legal treatment of Japanese-Americans constituted “racial
discrimination,” and that anger about American racism was inflaming
militarism in Japan in terms that identified with the point of view of his former
hosts: “if I were a Japanese, I should have that feeling.”48
And yet Wigmore’s ability to identify with an “other” as a result of his
time in Japan did not challenge his own precepts about the central relevance of
race in social policy or the categorization of legal systems.49 Nor did his
sympathy toward Japanese-Americans lead him to question racism toward less
exotic others. In one early article condemning a federal court’s decision
barring Japanese from naturalization as US citizens on grounds that they were
not “white,” for example, Wigmore argued that the judge’s logic could not be
defended as a matter of ethnology because
                                                
47 See, e.g., John H. Wigmore, Throwing Stones from Glass Houses,
JAPAN DAILY MAIL, Sep. 2, 1891; John H. Wigmore, American Naturalization
and the Japanese, THE JAPAN WEEKLY MAIL Aug. 25, 1894.
48 John H. Wigmore, Equality of Races, ASIA MAIL, March 1940.
49 See generally ALBERT KOCOUREK & JOHN H. WIGMORE, SOURCES OF
ANCIENT AND PRIMITIVE LAW (1915) (using race as a classification system for
legal traditions).
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the term ‘white’ cannot be systematically applied to any such
general theory as that adopted by the learned judge, or on any
other general theory; that it is in fact thoroughly inefficient as
to the basis for distinction.
At the brink of making the then radical claim that the notion of
whiteness was an unsustainable notion, Wigmore, in a classic lawyerly move,
limited his position to the case at hand with the argument that whiteness could
be defined “only in contrast with the African Negro” and that, in effect,
Japanese were more white than they were black.50
The argument captures the at once visionary and complacent
dimensions of Wigmore’s very ordinary humanism. Ultimately, his views
rarely fell far out of step with mainstream American bourgeois conservatism.
In actuality, his more progressive political positions were always somewhat
after the fact.51 Conversely, his more relativist academic inquiries often
                                                
50 John H. Wigmore, American Naturalization and the Japanese, THE
JAPAN WEEKLY MAIL (Aug. 25 1894).
51 The critique of foreign powers’ exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction
in Japan, for example, had become the majority view by the time of
Wigmore’s advocacy. England and the United States abandoned
extraterritorial jurisdiction with Japan in 1894, a year after Wigmore’s
departure, and other European countries followed shortly thereafter.
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art39
31
confirmed highly conservative political views. He encouraged Japan’s
colonization policy on grounds of Japanese equality with other great colonial
powers, for example, and one of his favorite themes was the oddity of
procedural safeguards in American criminal trials from an Asian standpoint:
In America, the Cleveland and Chicago horse-car strikes of a
few years ago offered the spectacle of a whole city’s
transportation system in the hands of armed-lawbreakers, with
the police divested of the power to use violence to dislodge
them…. The tenderness of the Anglo-Saxon race towards
criminals is certainly the result of a very peculiar attitude of
mind.52
The picture that emerges from Wigmore’s extraordinary life, then, is
that of an ambitious, adventurous, and ultimately ordinary man and scholar
caught in the political and intellectual milieu of his time, of which the
                                                
52 John H. Wigmore, Outrage by Soshi, THE JAPAN DAILY MAIL, Aug.
17, 1891. The only critical commentary on core Western values I have been
able to find in Wigmore’s entire corpus of writing about Japan is a reflection
on the loss of “personal ties” in acts of charity in the contemporary West. See
John H. Wigmore, Charity in Old Japan, JAPAN DAILY MAIL, Oct. 24, 1891,
and a number of critical comments about Christianity. See, e.g., John H.
Wigmore, The New Buddhism, THE JAPAN DAILY MAIL, March 31, 1892.
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encounter with a distant legal culture undergoing dramatic change was only
one powerful trope. What to make of the ordinary comparative experience




The unifying theme in Wigmore’s early work is the relationship
between new and old, between “custom” and “law”, between past and present.
53 His observations about the Japanese Parliament offer a glimpse of his
interests, and an example of his eye for detail:
The costumes, the building, the drapery, the whole scene, were
in appearance thoroughly Western, and one looked almost in
                                                
53 On this point, as on many others, Wigmore had a certain fondness for
clichés:
The old Japanese artists, in their masterly woodcuts, were fond
of depicting the celebrated mountain Fuji, one of the nation’s
(and the world’s) scenic gems. The art of the modern
photographer, too, may present it to us in another guise. The
impressions are different. But the mountain is the same.




vain for a touch of the Japanese. But perhaps the sight was on
that account more significant in its contrasts with the past.
Everyone remembers the killing of Richardson in 1862, the
young Englishman who rashly refused to yield the road to the
train of the great Daimyo of Satsuma, Shimadzu Saburo, and
was literally cut to pieces by the enraged retainers. The
redoubtable Saburo has passed away, but down in the front row
of Peers, in the very dress of the once-hated foreigners, sit his
two sons...All through the assembly stood men whose
recollections must have been in equally vivid contrast with the
scene in which they were taking part.54
As the emphasis on custom would imply, Wigmore writes within an
explicitly evolutionary paradigm.55 For example, “The Pledge Idea,” 56
                                                
54 John H. Wigmore, Starting a Parliament in Japan, SCRIBNER’S
MAGAZINE, July 1891, at 47.
55 The eminent Japanese jurist Kenzo Takayanagi writes that at the time
of Wigmore’s work in Japan, legal positivism was by far the dominant
philosophy of the young foreign law teachers at the major universities and that
natural law was regarded as outdated. This may explain in part Wigmore’s
support for the project to codify Japanese law: “[Wigmore,] like [Henry T.]
Terry, did not uphold natural law… Wigmore was historical and analytical. He
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perhaps his most respected work on the subject of comparative law, uses
comparative materials to attempt to trace the evolution of the institution of the
pledge in commercial transactions. This evolutionary paradigm provided the
justification for the comparison. Tokugawa Japan should be appreciated as a
“laboratory” of legal development, Wigmore argued, because of its isolation
from outside influences until Commodore Perry’s arrival in 1853:
The evolution of legal institutions involves the tracing of their
growth. But the reciprocal influences of one civilization upon
another form usually a complex phenomenon, difficult to trace.
Ever since Egypt and Mesopotamia, down through
                                                                                                                               
followed Maine as well as John Austin.” Kenzo Takayanagi, A Century of
Innovation: The Development of Japanese Law, 1868-1961, in LAW IN JAPAN:
THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 15-20 (Arthur Taylor von
Mehren, ed.) (1963). Wigmore’s co-edited 1915 text reproduces no less than
six chapters of Henry Maine’s Ancient Law. See generally PRIMITIVE AND
ANCIENT LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (John H. Wigmore & Albert Kocourek, eds.)
(1915).
56 John H. Wigmore, The Pledge Idea: A Study in Comparative Legal
Ideas, Part I, 10 HARV. L. REV. 321 (1897); John H. Wigmore, The Pledge




Mediterranean and European history, there have been
borrowings and reactions innumerable. To identify a particular
institution of a given country as a product of purely local and
internal conditions, or to trace its borrowed path through other
communities, has been too often the unattained ideal of the
evolutionist. …Now, in the laboratory methods of natural
science, one of the chief methods of tracing causes is to isolate
each hypothetical element and to observe its reactions in that
isolation under controlled conditions. So, too, in the study of
social evolution, the isolation of a community from outside
influences furnishes a decisive opportunity to study the
indigenous and inherent evolution of an institution. ...57
The genre of Wigmore’s early work, likewise, carefully mimicked that
of Henry Maine and his peers. Like Maine, Wigmore offers readers the thrill
of a grander, more historical perspective on familiar phenomena.58 For
example, after introducing Japan’s contemporary legal reforms, Wigmore
describes the many cases throughout history in which one society has
borrowed a new set of laws from another, and concludes:
                                                
57 Wigmore, supra note 23 at 49.
58 Cf. Riles, Representing In-Between: Law, Anthropology, and the
Rhetoric of Interdisciplinarity, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 597, 607-20.
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We see, then, that the work of Japan is but a drop in the sea, a
foot-path in the midst of highways, a single shot in the
cannonade of centuries. This is not depreciating the importance
of the work for Japan itself; for such a task seldom comes more
than once in a nation’s lifetime, and for each nation it has a
right to be considered as epoch-making. But the remembrance
that there is in progress a whole world-movement allows us to
look with greater calmness on its manifestation in any
particular quarter and to judge it more intelligently.59
Although Wigmore never overtly challenged the evolutionary
paradigm within which he worked, he found in the model a difference of
emphasis. Where Maine had emphasized difference--the question of why some
societies ceased to evolve while others continued to progress--Wigmore’s
interest was rather in commonalities. Wigmore describes the emergence of this
focus from his research in Japan:
All along the line, in Japanese legal history, were found
institutions analogous to European ones. And yet there had
been no possibility of imitation. Thus the problems of the
evolution of corresponding legal ideas in independent systems
                                                
59 John H. Wigmore, The Administration of Justice in Japan, Part III, 45
AMER. L. REG. & REV. 571, 573 (1897).
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were forced upon the student’s attention. …Del Vecchio’s
philosophy of the development of universal innate legal ideas
seemed here to be illustrated.60
If one compared practices concerning the treatment of earnest-money,
for example, “we find a coincidence of custom between Rome and Japan
which is not merely interesting but even startling.”61 Banks in seventeenth
century Japan, likewise,
lacked none of the essential features of our own. They received
on deposit, honored cheques, issued notes, negotiated bills of
exchange, discounted bills drawn against merchandise, and
acted in general as the intermediaries for commercial
transactions. The smaller banks were connected financially
with the larger ones, just as the country banks are with those of
                                                
60 Wigmore, supra note 23 at 49. (Wigmore refers here to Giorgio Del
Vecchio’s article, “Upon the Conception of a Science of Universal
Comparative Law,” published as Sull’Idea di una Scienza del Diritto
Universale Comparato, in BERICHT UBER DEN III INTERNATIONALALEN
KONGRESS FUR PHILOSOPHIE (1909).) Del Vecchio’s work was later compiled,
translated and published as part of Wigmore’s Legal Philosophy Series. See
GIORGIO DEL VECCHIO, THE FORMAL BASES OF LAW (John Lisle, trans., 1914).
61 Wigmore, supra note 59 at 578.
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American cities and the provincial banks are with those of
London. …They had some sort of a clearing-house system, the
details of which are not yet clear. In short, there is little in the
Western idea of a bank which the Japanese institution did not
have or could not easily have assimilated.62
This commitment to the discovery of endless examples of “universal
innate legal ideas” animates Wigmore’s entire project.63 In reading the
evolutionary paradigm backwards, it was possible to find a scientific argument
for his own secular and universalist humanism.64 Hence his own view of
comparative law as a mechanism for making universals apparent:
                                                
62 Wigmore, The Administration of Justice in Japan, 45 AM. L. REG.
REV. 628, 628-29 (1897).
63 The direction of the argument is succinctly outlined in the initial
chapters of Wigmore and Kocourek’s 1915 comparative law textbook: the
book begins with a chapter on “evolution of law,” then moves to “ethnological
jurisprudence,” then to “the origin of legal institutions,” and concludes with
“universal comparative law” (an exerpt of Del Vecchio’s 1910 article
translated by Kocourek). See generally ALBERT KOCOUREK & JOHN H.
WIGMORE, SOURCES OF ANCIENT AND PRIMITIVE LAW 3-72 (1915).
64 Some of Wigmore’s most intriguing writing from his time in Japan
concerns his encounter with Asian philosophy and religion. In an article about
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art39
39
By comparative law . . . is meant the tracing of an identical or
similar idea or institution through all or many systems, with a
view to discovering its differences and likenesses in various
systems, the reasons for those variations, and the nature and
limits of the inherent and invariable idea, if any--in short, the
evolution of the idea or institution, universally considered.65
                                                                                                                               
the similarities between the philosophies of Confucius and Emerson, for
example, he wrote,
it testifies to the unity of all experience; and there is something
in learning that, whatever the difference of epochs and
circumstances, the secret of life was the same for the
philosopher of an ancient Chinese principality and the thinker
of a modern democracy.
John H. Wigmore, Confucius and Emerson, THE JAPAN DAILY MAIL,
Sep. 25, 1891. This was reflected also in his support for the New Buddhism of
the time. A Unitarian, Wigmore was highly skeptical of organized Christianity
and was attracted to the philosophical subtleties of that blend of Buddhism and
scientific rationalism. Cf. ROALFE, supra note 17 at 244-47.
65 Wigmore wrote,
For example, in my study of the comparative pledge idea in
1897, I was able to demonstrate that in ten or twelve systems
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the modern institution of mortgage, in all alike, begins as an
absolute transfer; that in etymology the words for pledge, bet,
and forfeit are identical; that the idea of a conditional transfer
gradually emerges; that if the condition was not fulfilled at
maturity, the transferee retained the article without any duty of
restoring the surplus value...
Wigmore, supra note 23 at 51. Cf. Giorgio Del Vecchio, Science of
Comparative Law, in KOCOUREK & WIGMORE, supra note 49 at 66:
The fact that juridical institutions are subjected to a process of
evolution may appear to negative this unity. On the contrary, it
provides a new confirmation; since evolution itself manifests a
general attribute of humanity which is realized in an analogous
manner among the different peoples widely separated in space
and time, and having no connection with each other; where,
otherwise, to explain these phenomena, it would be necessary
to revert to the hypothesis of a common origin of the races
which in many cases is not verified, and where, for the rest, it
would be insufficient to justify the analogies observed. The
same evolution governs the general expression of the ethico-
juridical system and special institutions (such as property, the
family, etc.). They pass through a series of determinate stages
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art39
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Wigmore cryptically named this approach “Comparative Legal
Corporealogy.”66
Here we encounter the nexus of Wigmore’s universalist philosophy
and his “amateurism”. It is precisely the grand equivalences—the willingness
to see what today’s scholars would describe as a uniquely Japanese institution
as “some sort of a clearing-house system”— that renders his work largely
useless to contemporary scholars outside the legal academy.67 But note that the
amateurism is not simply the effect of an argument from another epoch. The
universals Wigmore seeks to uncover through comparative research are not
                                                                                                                               
in a definite order and frequently with the most remarkable
resemblances; even to the point of the smallest details, and
among nations without any historical association.
66 The term is intended to highlight the way in which different legal
systems, like parts of the body, are all part of one whole. See Wigmore, supra
note 23 at 51. Wigmore cites the Japanese scholar Nobushige Hozumi (cf.
Aoki, this volume) as the only example of a scholar who has achieved what he
believes comparative law should achieve. See id. at 52.
67 It is striking that recent work on Tokugawa legal institutions ignores
Wigmore’s work altogether. See, e.g., HERMAN OOMS, TOKUGAWA VILLAGE
PRACTICE: CLASS, STATUS, POWER, LAW (1996).
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Mainian,68 nor do they have their source in the kind of natural law philosophy
one might associate with modern law’s prehistory of posthistory69; Wigmore,
after all, was an historically minded positivist. Rather, Wigmore’s passion for
discovering “universal innate legal ideas” has its source in the same modern
humanism that animates twentieth century anthropology’s concern for
recording cultural difference, for example. The problem of Wigmore’s
amateurism, then, is not simply that Wigmore is out of date.
Consider, for example, Wigmore’s thinking about the relationship of
law to social context. The emergence of context as a problem and an
organizing device is one of the defining dimensions of modernism across a
                                                
68 He tells us, contrary to the Mainian evolutionary scheme, that a right
of property, for example, existed during the Tokugawa era: “This is worth
while insisting upon, for it is an idea not uncommon among foreigners that
Old Japan was a feudalism in which no rights of the common people were
recognized and respected.” John H. Wigmore, The Administration of Justice in
Japan, Part III, 45 AM. L. REG. REV. 571, 575 (1897).
69 This posthistory is evidenced, for example, in the odd collusion of the
Vatican and the human rights community around questions of the universalism
of human rights and values. See generally, Annelise Riles, [Deadlines], in




variety of disciplines, and this awareness of context brings with it the need for
a new set of disciplines and tools, from economics to sociology, for
understanding legal phenomena. One of the ways in which Wigmore is
thoroughly modern in this respect is his awareness of the social context of law
and of the relevance of social science to the problems he sought to address. As
Wigmore wrote of the records of Tokugawa legal institutions he collected,
In these trial records ...not only the legal life is pictured, but
also the whole domestic, social, agricultural and commercial
life. The testimonies of the parties are set forth in great detail,
and the daily events of importance in every walk of life are
frankly and vividly revealed. …There is a treasure house here
for the economist and for the social historian. Every aspect of
money lending, every trade and occupation, every commercial
transaction, every social institution, is set forth in the parties’
own stories.70
In its emphasis on interdependence and interconnections among legal
systems, and its insistence that law be understood as “but a part of human
life,”71 Wigmore’s work would have resonated with the contextual turn in
                                                
70 WIGMORE, LAW AND JUSTICE, supra note 42 at xv.
71 See John H. Wigmore, Problems of the Law’s Evolution, 4 VA. L.
REV. 247, 261 (1917).
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modernist legal scholarship. Indeed, Wigmore’s favorite metaphor for legal
evolution, the movement of planets in a planetary system,72 would have
captured the interest in relativism and relativity of a new epoch. Although he
wrote within an evolutionary paradigm, moreover, Wigmore displayed a
sensitivity to the relativism of a more modernist age:
The combination of ancient and primitive law itself results, in
fact, in inconsistency. Barring the controversy provoked by the
term “primitive” (for what is the test of “primitive”?) there are
examples of ancient law as modern in conception as anything
seen in the world to-day.73
Yet note that Wigmore’s notion of context is in a sense “backwards”
from the modernist conception outlined above. Here, it is not that law stands
to be interpreted in its social context, but that law serves as a source of
“stories” about the customs of the past, a source of context itself! This small
example captures the intellectual location of Wigmore’s work, in my
view—not behind, or unaware, or even ahead of the paradigm shifts of his era,
but consciously carelessly, somewhere else.
                                                
72 See id. at 264.
73 Albert Kocourek & John H. Wigmore, Preface, in KOCOUREK &
WIGMORE, supra note 49 at x.
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And there is more that renders this project naïve from our modernist
point of view: Wigmore’s faith in the discovery of universals makes of
comparative work a normative project on behalf of those universals—a
hopeful academic venture in the service of legal reform.74 For Wigmore, as
perhaps for generations of comparativists accused by their academic
colleagues of amateurism, scholarship and reformist ambition were
indistinguishable.75
                                                
74 For example, Justice in Old Japan spoke directly, in Wigmore’s mind,
to the debate over the merits of Westernization then raging among intellectuals
and politicians in Japan. Historical research demonstrated, in his view, that
seemingly foreign reforms in fact represented only a superficial transformation
of a deeper level of Japanese tradition. He responded to criticisms of the new
legal codes with the argument that the substantive rules in fact had their
analogs in Tokugawa law and custom. See John H. Wigmore, Mr. Kaneko on
Japanese Civilization, JAPAN DAILY MAIL, Aug. 28, 1891. Note that one of
Wigmore’s most important opponents in this debate, Nobushige Hozumi,
deployed comparative theories and ethnological data to equally powerful
effect (cf. Aoki, this volume).
75 Wigmore’s assumptions about the normative dimensions of
comparative law provide an interesting counterpoint to the contemporary view
that “comparison” and “governance,” as modes of scholarly engagement, are
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As Wigmore’s work developed, the genre, if not the argument,
underwent a deep transformation. It began with a shift in emphasis from
accounts of particular institutions, such as the pledge idea, to comparative
accounts of the character of different legal cultures. As the work progressed,
this more contextual style of scholarship afforded more room for vignettes,
biographies, and photographs which, Wigmore argued, presented a more
“realistic” picture of each legal system.76
Over the course of Wigmore’s career, therefore, the analytical
model—the evolutionary paradigm—gradually faded from overt view. In its
place, Wigmore foregrounded the details, the anecdotes, the enticement of the
facts. In his Panorama of the World’s Legal Systems, Wigmore describes each
of the legal systems he catalogs with particular attention to the character of the
institutions, rather than the doctrine per se, and he makes extensive use of
illustration. Kaleidoscope of Justice, 77 published over a decade later, goes
even further. In this book, Wigmore reviews much of the same material as in
                                                                                                                               
worlds apart. Cf. David Kennedy, The International Style in Postwar Law and
Policy 7 UTAH L. REV. 7 (1994).
76 See WIGMORE, supra note 53 at 3.
77 JOHN H. WIGMORE, KALEIDOSCOPE OF JUSTICE: CONTAINING




Panorama, but this time he abandons totalizing descriptions of legal
institutions altogether and focuses only on stories and images aimed at
revealing something of what he terms “ Justice.”78 For example, stories in the
chapter on Japanese law include an account of a custom of placing a bell and a
box outside the court for commoners to make their pleas directly to the
Shogun,79 and translated excerpts of documents from a case in which a wife
ran away from her husband, including a petition from the Buddhist convent to
which she had escaped about the rights of the convent to grant divorces.80 The
documents and the fragments of anecdotes make no claims to be
representative of the legal system as a whole, nor does Wigmore suggest what
conclusions should be drawn from their perusal.
\Figure 3 here\
Yet although I find Wigmore’s turn to images and stories intriguing
and even inspiring at points, for me, any effort to take Wigmore’s project
seriously as an intellectual venture reaches something of a stumbling block
over Wigmore’s pet label for his method, “comparative corporealogy.” Is this
a farce, one might wish to ask of the collections of documents, slides, songs
and typologies? “Comparative corpoeaology” seems to take to an extreme a
                                                
78 Id. at v.
79 Id. at 327.
80 Id at 339-48.
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dimension of comparative legal work which, as noted at the outset, has been
the basis of a good deal of self-loathing within the discipline. Indeed, if
Wigmore’s early comparative work would have been treated as of great
scholarly importance in his lifetime, his later work was avidly criticized by his
contemporaries as amateuristic. As even one of Wigmore’s most devoted
supporters wrote in a review, Panorama “is not a book for experts embodying
the author’s researches, but it is worth our special notice as a new attempt by a
veteran legal writer to popularize the subject for the general public.”81 A
reconsideration of Wigmore’s contribution to comparative law therefore
prompts a further question: How are we to read the many comparative projects
and paradigms, such as this one, that seem to flaunt our collective
amateurism?
#
A Performance of Gaps
#
                                                
81 The Japanese reviewer focused instead on Wigmore’s service to Japan
and on his relationships with Japanese scholars and lawyers. See Shinzo
Koizumi, Dr. John Henry Wigmore: The Panorama of the World’s Legal




Towards the end of Wigmore’s life, a surprise opportunity for
nostalgia presented itself. The Japan Cultural Society invited Wigmore to
return to Japan to complete the translation project he had begun forty years
before.82 By the time of his arrival, the work had already begun under the
leadership of several Japanese scholars, and although it proceeded under
Wigmore’s nominal direction, Wigmore’s tasks seem to have been limited to
final proofreading over a period of just two months.83 Wigmore announced
                                                
82 John Henry Wigmore Re-Visits Japan, THE ALUMNI NEWS (1935).
83 Wigmore’s request to begin the work in Chicago before his arrival in
Tokyo was explicitly rejected in terms that made clear the division of labor
envisioned by his Japanese sponsors:
Your suggestion is very recommendable and I would like to
accept it, had it not been for the fear that you might be
confronted with the same difficulty Professor Miegishi is now
encountering; namely the difficulty of verifying the accuracy of
translation of so many peculiar vocabularies and phrases that
appear in the MSS. They are not to be found even in the best
dictionaries available at present, and only by the service of
experts can they be accurately translated. This matter is
withholding the rapid progress of the work. Under such
circumstances, I would recommend you to let Professor
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upon his arrival that “his was not a pleasure trip.”84 Yet the era in which a
foreign generalist effortlessly assumed the reins had long passed in Japan.
From the standpoint of his foreign hosts, too, Wigmore the ambitious young
scholar had become Wigmore the amateur.
During this return visit, Wigmore delivered a series of “lantern slide
lectures” on the subject of comparative law. The lectures summarized his
“legal corporealogy” approach, in simplified guise, with one twist: Wigmore
illustrated his argument with exotic anecdotes and outrageous special effects,
including a live physics experiment with the use of a balloon and a gyroscope,
and a trick performed with a ribbon and a bicycle wheel. 85  Critics wrote
about the performance with a mixture of bewilderment and condescension. I
                                                                                                                               
Minegishi proof read the MSS first before you give the final
touch.
Setsuichi Aoki, Letter from the General Secretary of the Society for
International Cultural Relations to John Henry Wigmore (March 6, 1936).
The introduction to each volume makes it clear that the Japanese editors
deviated considerably from Wigmore’s translation. See WIGMORE, LAW AND
JUSTICE, supra note 42.
84 See Koizumi, supra note 81.




suspect that in an era of realist “fact skepticism”86 Wigmore’s flood of details,
and his appeal to the fascinations of natural science, would have seemed in
need of serious updating. Yet what I hope to illustrate is that to the extent that
these lectures were dismissed for their lack of “new theories” they were
profoundly misread. What Wigmore gave his audience, rather, was a virtuoso
performance in the American law professor’s genre, transposed into
comparative legal studies. Indeed, we might read them as an instantiation of
Wigmore’s entire comparative project: a performative experiment in how law
engages.
\Figure 4 here\
What did Wigmore’s audience have in mind when they dismissed work
such as the lantern slides lectures as amateuristic? The reviews repeatedly
pointed out that Kaleidoscope was simply a collection of stories and images,
without more. 87  There was no guidance from the author as to the scientific or
doctrinal significance of the items collected on the page. Wigmore failed to
analyze his material, to produce an argument. Contrast this failure, for
example, with the indicia of knowledge in the academy in the twentieth
century that have served as one powerful model for legal scholarship in the
                                                
86 See WILFRID E. RUMBLE, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 107-36 (1968).
 87 Cf. George F. James, A Literary Stylist, 32 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 275 (1941) (reviewing Wigmore, Kaleidoscope of Justice).
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post-Realist era (and which I refer to here as modern academic knowledge).88
Here, the task is to identify and organize a series of facts by adding to these
facts a layer of analysis that relates them in an innovative way.89 The modern
academic analysis guides the reader through the experience of the data, and
ultimately is what is “gained” from the scholarly experience. The amateurism
of Wigmore’s comparative legal scholarship, from this point of view, lies in its
failure even to attempt an analytical output of this kind. There is no finished
product, only a heap of raw material. The text leaves glaring analytical gaps.
Not every self-conscious modernist saw things this way, however.
Early critics of nineteenth century classicism in the United States and Europe
                                                
88 I choose the term “academic” to index the opposite of “amateur”
because of the confusion that the word “professional” might cause given the
association of law schools with professional education. I do not intend to
reduce all academic knowledge to a singular type, nor do I mean to imply that
law professors could not be modern academics in the sense in which I invoke
the term here. Indeed, many of the critical reviews of Wigmore’s work,
written by law professors, might serve as paradigmatic performances of the
academic genre.
89 Cf. MARILYN STRATHERN, PARTIAL CONNECTIONS (1991); Marilyn




readily recognized Wigmore as one of their own. Édouard Lambert understood
Wigmore’s project as less normative and programmatic than his own, but
nevertheless of great scientific value,90 and he greatly admired Wigmore’s
scholarship and his skills as a “propagandist” for comparative law.91 In
                                                
90 The two exchanged manuscripts and shared information frequently.
See, e.g., Édouard Lambert, Letter to John H. Wigmore, July 13, 1925;
Édouard Lambert, Letter to John H. Wigmore, October 3, 1929. Lambert
campaigned for Wigmore’s nomination to the World Court, see Édouard
Lambert, Letter to John H. Wigmore, April 21, 1930; Édouard Lambert, Letter
to John H. Wigmore, April 28, 1930; Édouard Lambert, Letter to John H.
Wigmore, May 5, 1930, arranged for the awarding of an honorary doctorate
from the University of Lyon to Wigmore, see Édouard Lambert, Letter to John
H. Wigmore, and sought Wigmore’s assistance in procuring funding for his
projects. See Édouard Lambert, Letter to John H. Wigmore, April 20, 1929.
91 Édouard Lambert, Letter to John H. Wigmore, April 3, 1930. In recent
years, the visual and entertaining dimensions of modernist science have
received some critical attention. See, e.g., JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A
NEW SCIENCE (1987); BARBARA M. STAFFORD, ARTFUL SCIENCE:
ENLIGHTENMENT ENTERTAINMENT AND THE ECLIPSE OF VISUAL EDUCATION
(1994); Bruno Latour, Drawing Things Together, in REPRESENTATION IN
SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE 19-68 (M. Lynch and S. Woolgar, eds. 1988).
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particular, Lambert was very much attracted to the presentation of Wigmore’s
argument:
Dans leur ensemble, elles constituent pour des juristes, et
surtout pour des historiens de droit, une documentation vivante,
réaliste, saisisante. C’est ça la transplantation à l’enseignement
de l’histoire du droit, et particulièrement au droit comparé, de
methods d’illustration par l’image qui commencent à être
pratiqués chez vous pour l’enseignement de l’histoire générale,
mais qui n’avont encore jamais été engagés sur le terrain de
l’histoire juridique. Dans le domaine du droit c’est quelque
chose de très neuf—comme vos cartes—et quelque chose de
très fécund.92
                                                
92 In translation:
Taken as a whole, [the images] constitute for jurists, and
especially for legal historians, a living documentation, realistic,
moving. This is the transplantation of methods of illustration
with images that are beginning to be used in your country for
teaching history, but which have never been used on juridical
terrain. In the domain of law this is something of very
new—like your cards—and something most fecund.
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art39
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Likewise, Roscoe Pound greatly admired Wigmore’s scholarly project
and erudition, although, unlike Lambert, he found Wigmore’s genre somewhat
obtuse:
I think Wigmore understands the problem of application of
law—the fundamental problem of jurisprudence today—better
than anyone in this country unless it is Mr. Justice Holmes.
What makes his writing on the subject difficult to understand,
perhaps, is that he has not run through the current decisions and
compelled himself to look at the problem as it is presented in
the everyday workings of our courts. No one is more fertile in
good ideas than Wigmore, and really he is worth careful
reading and careful reflection after reading, and I guarantee will
yield great results when so read and reflected upon. Of course
when he is riding on his high horse it is another matter. But
                                                                                                                               
Édouard Lambert, Letter to John H. Wigmore, January 31, 1929 (on file
at Northwestern University library). Lambert refers here to Wigmore’s
notorious Christmas cards, in which he composed personalized poems on
scholarly themes. See, e.g., Wigmore, infra note 94.
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many things may be pardoned to one who has achieved what he
has in the science of law.93
Then, as perhaps now, in other words, Wigmore’s work seemed at
once utterly relevant to and yet somewhat disengaged from his time. In order
to come to terms with this fact, I turn first to Wigmore’s affinity for American
classical or formalist legal thought and its influence on his comparative
project.
#
At first blush, it may seem counter-intuitive to describe scholarship
such as the Lantern Slide Lectures or Kaleidoscope as classicist or formalist in
the Langdellian mold. To a contemporary reader, the genre of the work—the
collections of images, scientific experiments, translations and theories into one
all-inclusive text—might bear more resemblance to contemporary postmodern
scholarship than to the treatises of the late nineteenth century. On a more
theoretical level, also, Wigmore readily aligned himself with the Realist
critiques of classical legal scholarship.94 First, the new discipline of
                                                
93 Roscoe Pound, Letter to Henry M. Bates, Dean of the University of
Michigan Law School, March 24, 1931 (on file with the author).
94 This is particularly evident in Wigmore’s correspondence with
Holmes, Pound, and other prominent critics of formalism. See, e.g., John H.
Wigmore, Letter to Judge Holmes, April 29, 1894 (praising Holmes for “a step
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art39
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which will make the heterodox orthodox” and presenting his own ideas for a
new and more functional analytical framework for the law of torts). Wigmore
was one of Roscoe Pound’s earliest and most enthusiastic supporters, and his
own treatise on evidence was criticized for its modernist terminology by the
same factions that led the attack on Pound. See DAVID WIGDOR, ROSCOE
POUND: PHILOSOPHER OF LAW 129 (1974). Wigmore’s Christmas greeting to
Pound in the latter’s first year on the Northwestern Law faculty captures
Wigmore’s unique brand of enthusiasm for the Realist project:
All hail the newest star,
now fixed amidst our constellation!
A brilliant varied spectrum
marks your lofty stellar station.
As sociologic jurist,
may the message of your pen
Widely spread a mighty influence,
from your editorial den!
When Pharaoh had his Moses:
you’re the Moses by whose hand
Our common law will pass from bondage
to the promised land.
Id. at 135.
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
58
comparative law was de facto associated with the critique of classical thought
in Europe and the United States (cf. Lasser, Curran, this volume). Wigmore’s
self-conscious promotion of the discipline would therefore have been widely
understood as a challenge to traditional legal scholarship.  Like the American
Realists, moreover, Wigmore’s comparisons emphasized change,
discontinuity, conflict and power in the evolution of the legal tradition, and
hence his work could be read as a challenge to homogeneic or ahistorical
conceptions of legal norms. As Wigmore wrote in 1917,
[E]volution of Law, as in other cosmic facts, is always the
result of a conflict of forces. The situation is very much like
that of two men pushing face to face on the pavement, each
seeking to pass, or wrestling in a final grip on the mat; in the
wrestling match, finally a slight balance of force prevails, and
the one man falls on his back, with the other over him as the
winner. Then there is equilibrium for a while, but only until the
next bout begins.95
Nevertheless, in many respects, Wigmore’s larger project is
archetypically Langdellian. Or, more accurately, Wigmore shared with
                                                
95 Wigmore, supra note 71 at 253.
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Langdell and his followers a “historist” tradition.96  Although the materials
Wigmore collected and exhibited were quite new to legal formalism, the kinds
of questions he asked of those materials would have been familiar and
comfortable. One would not expect less from a founder of the Harvard Law
                                                
96 Cf. Stephen A. Siegel, Historicism in Late Nineteenth-Century
Constitutional Thought, 1990 WISC. L. REV. 1431.
Historism conceived law as an evolving product of the mutual
interaction of race, culture, reason and events. Moreover,
historism taught that objective legal principles were discernible
through historical studies, not rationalistic introspection. …
Historism’s central claim was that historical studies reveal
objective social norms and moral values. This claim rested
upon a host of tenets, the most important of which were (1) that
societies, social norms and institutions are the outgrowth of
continuous change effected by secular causes; (2) that the
universe has an ethical meaning that is accessible to human
intelligence; and (3) that societies, social norms and institutions
evolve according to moral ordering principles that are
discoverable through historical studies.
Id. at 1435 (footnotes omitted).
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Review, and an acknowledged missionary for the case method in the frontiers
of intellectual life. 97
Take, for example, Wigmore’s “legal corporeology” approach. What
renders the term amateuristic to the point of absurdity to modern academic
ears is precisely what would have appealed to the Langdellian taste for
scientific analogies. Anthony Sebok recently has argued that, contrary to
Realist characterizations, Langdellian formalism was committed to the notion
of law as organic, living, and hence evolving over time.98 Langdell’s model
for legal reasoning, Sebok claims, was the field of biology: the courts were
“laboratories,” decisions should be thought of as “specimens,” and the task
was to “select, classify and arrange all the cases which had contributed in any
important degree to the growth, development, or establishment of . . . essential
doctrines.”99 This attraction to law as a scientific study of organic change
                                                
97 See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA
FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S 60 (1983) (describing Harvard University
President Eliot’s congratulations to Wigmore for “having got into a missionary
diocese”).
98 See ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE 95 (1998).
99 Langdell quoted in SEBOK, supra note 98 at 93.
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pervades Wigmore’s project. As Kocourek and Wigmore wrote in the Preface
to their early textbook in comparative law,
There is a special kind of fascination in attempting here what
seems to have been done with great success in the
reconstruction of fossil remains of extinct animals. A single
bone may lead to the reconstruction of the entire skeleton based
on the size, shape, and function of the fragment used as a
starting-point. Biological function however is immeasurably
more simple than legal function; the one is related to the world
of physical phenomena, the other to the world of mental and
physical facts.100
Thus, although Wigmore clearly felt lonely in the presence of
American formalists, and although his work was devalued and even dismissed
when he first sought to introduce his former Harvard teachers to the emerging
field of comparative law, Wigmore’s love of comparison nevertheless built on
the formalist sensibilities he had developed as a student. The case book, as
used by Langdell, made liberal use of English cases as a means of learning
through comparative analysis what essential legal principles persisted over
                                                
100 ALBERT KOCOUREK & JOHN H. WIGMORE, FORMATIVE INFLUENCES
OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENT viii (1918).
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time.101 The Socratic method, likewise, was all about comparison: starting
from a more or less explicit and absolute notion of the coherence of law and
legal decision-making, the notion that “like cases should be treated alike,” one
compared facts and rules to reach conclusions either about the particular case
or the legal principle as a whole. Indeed, the exercise of law teaching was
largely concerned with inculcating in students a refined comparative sense.
The difference, of course, was that while the Langdellian formalist
compared cases and rules to attempt to make visible, or discover, a latent
system, Wigmore sought to compare systems. Indeed, as noted earlier, “legal
corporeology” was meant to highlight precisely the interconnections and
contexts. As sophisticated readers of formalism, Lambert and other modern
comparativists would have understood, of course, that although the
relationship of data to analysis in Wigmore’s work was thoroughly
Langdellian, the problem Wigmore addressed -- his subject -- was quite
different. Wigmore had used formalist knowledge practices against themselves
to usher in a new era.
 Nevertheless, the strangeness of the biological metaphor to modern
ears illustrates how distant Wigmore’s work also was from the social scientific
model of Pound and others. The amateurism resides in the relationship of facts
                                                
101 Edwin W. Patterson, The Case Method in American Legal Education:
Its Origins and Objectives, 4 J. LEG. ED. 1, 11 (1951).
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to theory. Wigmore’s focus on exemplary cases that stood for and illustrated
larger principles was archetypally Langdellian.102 By the time of Wigmore’s
writing, the evolutionary paradigm that sustained this search for generalities
would have been already well trodden.103 Ironically, however, the worn
quality of these themes presented Wigmore, like other late nineteenth century
Langdellians, with an opportunity: he could take the theoretical model for
granted, and indulge, rather, in the detail, the customs, the local facts. For
Wigmore, as for Langdell, theory was what one borrowed from Maine and
others. What contemporary comparativists would describe as a theory, in
contrast, (for example Wigmore’s theory about the evolution of the pledge)
was for him a fact established scientifically through comparative work. In this
sense, comparative law was ultimately a localized, factual endeavor, albeit one
with theoretical underpinnings and implications.104
                                                
102 See SEBOK, supra note 98 at 58.
103 See, e.g., RAYMOND COCKS, SIR HENRY MAINE: A STUDY IN
VICTORIAN JURISPRUDENCE 247 (1988).
104 The factual emphasis of Wigmore’s project is relevant where the
debate over the amateurism of Comparative Law has often been framed as a
question of an excess of theory. See, e.g., William Alford, On the Limits of
“Grand Theory” in Comparative Law, 61 WASH. L. REV. 945 (1986); W.B.
Groves, & G. Newman, Against General Theory in Comparative Research, 13
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One way to think about the difference of expectations surrounding
Wigmore’s work is from the point of view of the relations that intellectual
work is intended to generate—the relationship between author and audience,
and the extent to which that relationship is mediated by the scholarly text. As
Tony Crook has recently argued, for modern academics, textually mediated
analysis engenders the social relations that are integral to professional success.
A work’s audience is the small community of readers who might be enticed to
join the author in a debate. Ideas—units of analysis that speak to existing
arguments and the communities that stand behind them in the appropriately
situated and yet self-differentiated way—engender (academic) persons. To be
an academic, then, is to have a stake in being a person in this sense.105 Yet in
Wigmore’s most cherished roles as collector, translator, correspondent, critic
                                                                                                                               
INT’L J. OF COMP. & APP. CRIM. JUS. 23 (1989); Mathias Reimann, The End of
Comparative Law as an Autonomous Subject, 11 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L. FORUM.
49 (1996); Eric Stein, Uses, Misuses--and Nonuses of Comparative Law, 72
NW. U. L. REV. 198 (1977).
105 See Tony Crook, The Textual Person, Paper presented at the
American Anthropological Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, Illinois,
November 17-21, 1999 (manuscript on file with the author).
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and editor,106 the relationality is within the edited text, not without—among
the diverse fragments of essays and illustrations, each with their own diffuse
authorship. From the modern academic’s point of view, Wigmore’s curious
failure to analyze his materials, and his disclaimer of originality that can be
situated in relation to the work of others, seems to treat his own relations
outside the text, that is, in the community of scholars, as superfluous. We
might read the progressive fading of analytical structures in Wigmore’s work
over the course of his career alluded to earlier in this chapter as a privilege of
his amateur status. To topple a predecessor’s model or to mount a critique is
the ultimate relational, participatory move. Yet to gradually background a
model, as Wigmore does of evolutionary theory, is to assert with increasing
self-confidence that one has no particular stake in the “debate” per se.
Perhaps this is because for Wigmore the Institution, the darling of the
classroom, the law school and the bar association, the global correspondent
                                                
106 One of Wigmore’s favorite genres was the book review; he enjoyed
reading academic work and presenting it to a new audience. In Japan, he
summarized the doctoral dissertations of Japanese scholars returning from the
West, and he also wrote articles in American academic journals introducing
American audiences to the work of more established Japanese scholars. Later
in his career he continued this practice as editor of numerous monograph
series.
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and world traveler, social relations were elsewhere. Indeed, one difference
between the professional and the amateur is that the latter by definition does
not live by his or her ideas. Wigmore would have had no need to make himself
relevant through his work; he already was relevant in every socially and
institutionally significant way. Perhaps, then, thinking about interesting
questions becomes what we would call a hobby: a privilege of Wigmore’s
hard-earned position, a chance for adventure, a secret deviance even, but not
the source of personal relevance. Wigmore might prompt us to wonder
whether scholarship produced as a source of personal relevance can always
and inherently be assumed make the greater contribution—or rather why the
social effects of scholarship should be judged in only one narrow way.
Wigmore’s conceptualization of the scholarly venture was not, and is
not, unique, I think. It is no wonder, in other words, that Lambert would have
seen a powerful and productive parallel between Wigmore’s inventive
scholarship and his inventive Christmas cards: The volumes of personal
correspondence and frequent visits among comparativists, the yearly
conferences and international congresses at which it is openly acknowledged
that the main attraction is the opportunity to see friends, not to hear academic
papers,107 the several associations, each with their own baroque politics, the
                                                
107 See Legrand, supra note 15 at 22 (quoting John Merryman as writing,
“Like most international congresses, these are valuable primarily for the
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art39
67
committees for the harmonization of legal rules, and the frequent festschrift
volumes108 suggest that for this community, the work of relationality lies
elsewhere. The community of comparativists is not textually constituted and
mediated. The joint project, rather, is institution building.
 Yet there is more at issue here, I think, than a simple division of
intellectual labor into what is professionally significant and what is not. If one
remembers that Langdellian formalism was most explicitly a teaching
method—that its epistemological, normative and scholarly implications
remained largely implicit until they were unearthed in the guise of critique by
                                                                                                                               
opportunities to meet people and see friends. What the organizers call the
“scientific programme” is almost always a debacle.”)
108 See, e.g., ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF PROFESSOR F. H. LAWSON (Peter
Wallington & Robert M. Merin, eds., 1986); Essays in HONOUR OF JUDGE
TASLIM OLAWALE ELIAS (Emmanuel G. Bello & Bola A. Ajiboa, eds. 1992);
COMPARATIVE AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN
HENRY MERRYMAN ON HIS SEVENTIETH BIRTHDAY (David S. Clark, ed. 1990);
COMPARABILITY AND EVALUATION: ESSAYS ON COMPARATIVE LAW, PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN
HONOUR OF DIMITRA KOKKINI-IATRIDOU (K. Boele-Woelki et al. eds. 1994);
LEGAL THEORY COMPARATIVE LAW: STUDIES IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR IMRE
SZABO (Zoltan Petri, ed. 1984).
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a later generation—then the notion that the form of Wigmore’s eclectic
comparative work would reflect the wider genre of formalist legal teaching
and debate should not strike us as strange. Wigmore was deeply interested in
the application of the case method and the dynamics of law teaching generally,
and much of his scholarship was explicitly presented in the genre of a teaching
tool--for academics, law students and the wider community of lawyers.
Consider, for example, the casebooks used in legal teaching: If
Wigmore would have opposed Langdell’s view that the only relevant materials
for legal study were those contained in printed books,109 he clearly followed
Langdell’s emphasis on the exposure of students to primary materials:
For the student, the best results will be gotten by attempting
first to master the raw materials of the first volume, in analogy
to the case-method; that is to say, by making an effort to
reconstruct for himself, from topic to topic, the state of
development of the legal institutions among . . . 110
These texts are, as their name implies, “materials”—collections of
essays and documents. The idea is that the very absence of answers to the
text’s open-ended questions will stimulate a response from the student and
                                                
109 See Patterson, supra note 101 at 3.
110 2 PRIMITIVE AND ANCIENT LEGAL INSTITUTIONS v (Albert Kocourek
& John H. Wigmore, eds. 1915).
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spark a dynamic discussion in class; they are tools for creating a moment. 111
In typically Socratic fashion, Wigmore and Kocourek insist that they “have
not sought here to solve any problems of their own, or to ventilate any
theories” and that “[e]very reader will interpret his own philosophy of history,
and construct his own generalizations.”112 Although the collection and display
of disparate fragments is found in some avant-garde forms of literature and art,
it probably achieves mainstream status only in American legal teaching tools.
Contrast this to the texts used in graduate education in the humanities and
social sciences¾ finished papers and essays that give students an outsider’s
glance at a very internal debate.
Wigmore’s project, as exemplified by texts such as Panorama and
Kaleidoscope, seems reasonable to him, then, just as it seems a bit overdrawn
and hence amateuristic to his critics, precisely because it is the formalist genre
                                                
111 I follow here Keith Basso’s suggestion that anthropologists
understand written texts as “always one of several communication channels
available” and his call to understand “the conditions under which [writing] is
selected and the purposes to which it is put . . . in relation to those other
channels.” Keith H. Basso, The Ethnography of Writing, in EXPLORATION IN
THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF SPEAKING 425, 426 (Richard Bauman & Joel Scherzer,
eds., 1989).
112 Kocourek & Wigmore, supra note 110 at viii.
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expanded from the context of teaching to scholarship. To return to the
question of academic relations addressed above, another way to put this is to
say that for the formalist legal scholar,113 the text does not stand for the self in
the way it does for the academic, nor does the textual debate stand for the
community in which the self is constituted. This is because for the formalist,
the relevant site of academic relationality is not the text but the classroom. The
prototype of the evidence of the self is the classroom performance; it serves as
model for various other genres of formal and informal conversations among
peers. In each genre, the evidence of academic sociality is the momentary
conversation the performance elicits. Where the ideal academic debate
engages a group of a particular size—not too large and not too small—the
formalist “debate” potentially encapsulates anyone who witnesses the
performance—teachers, students, practioners, colleagues, patrons, strangers
with whom one happens to be sharing lunch. The achievement of such
                                                
113 I use the term “formalist” interchangeably with “legal scholar”
because as I indicate later, I believe legal knowledge is inherently formalistic
as an aesthetic and performative genre, indeed, that this is one of the defining
traits of legal thought, whatever its normative or epistemological claims. Cf.
ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 169 (1993) (“For all their
fashionableness and novelty, the law and claims and critical legal studies
movements are essentially Langdellian in spirit.”)
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momentary relationality is dependent on the performer’s ability to generate
interest at that moment by framing a question or set of materials in a
sufficiently focused and yet general way such that a contentious conversation
can be generated in a matter of minutes among the members of the audience.
For the formalist, reputation is determined by performative skill
therefore. No matter how successful the performance and lively the
conversation, however, it is not expected that the conversation will be
sustained beyond the event. Legal knowledge is not about creating a sustained
intellectual debate in this way, and therefore ideas (if defined, as above, as
appropriately differentiated but situated units of analysis) are not of primary
concern. My point, then, is that formalism cannot be reduced to a theoretical
position and an accompanying epistemology. It is also an aesthetic judgement,
a genre of self-presentation for the author and the text. From this point of
view, I believe we can understand the gaps in comparative legal analysis, of
which Wigmore’s work offers an admittedly extreme example, as in legal
analysis more broadly, as not just a matter of carelessness, but as an outcome,
a consequence, of the author’s performative goals.
One way of understanding the relationship between Langdellian
formalism and the classroom performance, as practiced and promoted by
Wigmore in his work on comparative law, is to consider sociological theories
of play. In his classic work on the subject, Erving Goffman distinguishes the
game—the self-contained rules—from play—the experience of performing the
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rules.114 Play is contingent on the game, and hence is understandable only by
looking to the rules, but it is also a distinct genre of activity. In order for
games to hold the attention of participants, the outcomes must be both
predictable only with reference to the rules, but also contingent.115 Moreover,
the relationship of the “mutual focused activity” of the game and the outside
world is integral to the game’s success.116 The outside world is often
introduced in a controlled or transformed manner (for example in the rule that
spouses cannot serve as partners in a bridge game), and ideally, this manner
will also serve as a ground for exhibiting skills one has developed elsewhere
(as in the importance of memory, or strategy in many games).117 This is
                                                
114 See ERVING GOFFMAN, ENCOUNTERS: TWO STUDIES IN THE
SOCIOLOGY OF INTERACTION 35 (1961).
115 See id. at 62.
116 See id. at 33.
117 See id. at 68-77. Patterson argues that one of the goals of the case
method is to provide a kind of “vicarious experience” that will “acquaint the
student with the contemporary culture in which he lives and in which legal
devices are operative . . . By ‘culture’ I mean nothing more occult than the
practices of people in buying and selling, in hiring and firing, in getting houses
built and business enterprises financed, in evading or avoiding income taxes,
and the like.” Patterson, supra note 101 at 15.
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achieved, Goffman argues, through mutually agreed “rules of irrelevance” in
which participants promise not to think about certain aspects of their shared
experience (for example, the fact that the chess players could remove one
another’s pieces by simply knocking them off the table) for the duration of the
game.118
Goffman’s vocabulary makes plain, I think, how the classroom
experience that Langdell pioneered, and that continues largely to this day, is
enabled by the underlying Langdellian epistemology, theory and practice of
law. The prowess which the successful teacher or student demonstrates in the
classroom is imagined as an indication of his or her potential skill as a lawyer,
albeit demonstrated in disguised form. The successful game at the law school,
as on the football field, depends on participants’ degree of engagement with
the performance, and this in turn depends on the existence of a certain element
of surprise as to the direction that the event might go. This in turn depends on
sufficiently fixed but also subtly porous rules of irrelevance that enable the
event to echo the experience of the wider world but also maintain its focused,
momentary quality. In the law school classroom, of course, it is the precepts of
formalism that provide those rules. Moreover, as we have seen, the complex
Langdellian notion of the place of history on the one hand and logic on the
other in the science of legal reasoning enables a “vicarious” experience of
                                                
118 See id. at 19.
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social life, and even a great exercise in comparison, without ultimately
undermining the structure of the game itself.
In focusing on the teaching of comparative law, then, I believe that
Wigmore ironically found in his own formalist tradition something of
enduring interest to a new era of legal scholars. This was true even though the
teaching model Wigmore deployed was very much unique to the American
legal tradition, and something quite apart from the genre of teaching prevalent
in the social sciences that were then serving as the inspiration for legal theory.
It is at least suggestive, I think, that realist comparative legal scholars, like the
realists more generally, spared the classroom performance from the critique
they leveled at the formalist academic text and in fact engaged in the
performance to great effect themselves.119 I suggest this, of course, not in the
                                                
119 On the “practical” question of teaching methods, Pound had very
similar ideas to Wigmore’s. As he wrote to Wigmore in 1905, a casebook
method was far more practical than a social scientific approach in training
American law students in comparative law:
I had inclined to prepare somewhat carefully a small book of
extracts illustrating the history of juristic thought and to try
teaching from it as an experiment, but I am not at all certain
that such a plan would meet the requirements of the situation.
Probably the ideal method would be to insist in some way upon
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guise of yet another realist critique of law for failing to be social science, but
as an effort to understand the unique character of legal knowledge on its own
terms.
In appropriating the formalism of legal teaching to scholarship, and
hence actively collapsing the difference between the treatise and the
classroom, in other words, Wigmore brilliantly collapses the distinction
between performative and analytical genres of formalism. In an era in which
the epistemological and political foundations of formalism, as a doctrinal
theory, found themselves under attack, Wigmore stretches formalism to the
limits of its plausibility. His innovation circumvents the intellectual aridity of
analytical formalism, which Wigmore was explicitly against, while preserving
the “logical universal form” which Wigmore’s inspiration, Georgio Del
Vecchio, described as a “necessary condition to experience juridical facts,”120
                                                                                                                               
adequate economic and sociological training as a prerequisite
for admission to a law school. But…I fear that a thorough
course in constitutional law would tend to dissipate all the
results of prior academic training.
Roscoe Pound, Letter to John H. Wigmore, May 11, 1905 (on file with
the author).
120 Del Vecchio, supra note 65 at 64. Del Vecchio adds,
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by rediscovering formalism’s performative side. It was the perfect innovation
for an amateur radical and a sometime visionary.
I believe we should read this innovation on doctrinal formalism as on
par with the analytical critique of formalism more famously associated with
the realists. Wigmore’s work suggests that formalism, as a genre of
scholarship and teaching, may be effectively performed even when the
epistemological or theoretical foundations of the performance are entirely at
odds with the beliefs routinely associated with a formalistic understanding of
law. Wigmore’s performative genre recreates formalism as a condition for the
abeyance of analysis, the gaps that make play contingent and hence
                                                                                                                               
Recognition of this transcendental condition of juridical
experience does not diminish the value of experience itself.
Rather, it puts experience in its true light and guarantees it
authority in its own field. In reality, we are able and ought to
borrow from experience as an inexhaustible fountain,
knowledge of the content that law has provided in space and
time. From what has been just said nothing which credits the
study of historical facts in which a juridical character is found
is an obstruction to going back in turn to the formal idea of




interesting, not just the excess thereof, as is often assumed in antiformalist
critiques of formalism’s undetermined and arid logic.
In particular, comparativists may take an interest in the universalism at
the heart of Wigmore’s work which, as we saw, also explained contemporary
dismissals of the work as amateuristic. One of the assumptions that the
formalist author/speaker must make in order performatively to generate a
momentary debate is that the audience is composed of persons that one
understands, with whom one shares a series of assumptions and background
knowledge as well as interest and affect. Like students in the classroom in the
didactic tradition, the audience is, in a sense, understood from the start.
Wigmore extends this notion of “we” not simply within but without, from the
relationships of teacher and student or audience to the relationship of the
author to his subject. His vision is of a universal set of legal principles and a
universal notion of Justice appropriate for an ultimately common humanity.
This understanding in turn assumes access to the minds of other people
(imagined to be only superficially different from ourselves). As in the law
school classroom, it is this assumption of commonality that ultimately
generates the excitement of learning. As he wrote of his interest in traditional
Japanese forms of association such as mutual aid societies,
For the student of institutions, the reconstructor of systems and
of forms of society, there is much material. But the living
interest of such records is even greater. Difficult enough it is to
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get at the inner life, the motives, the mind-workings of a people
so differently constituted from ourselves; but here the actions
and interactions of a brotherhood of men in free and informal
intercourse are laid bare to us with an unconsciousness and an
ingenuousness which is as rare as it is fascinating.121
In other words, Wigmore’s work demonstrates how, within the
framework of its own universal truths, formalism expands to include virtually
any fact or paradigm.122 In one of the only explorations of “ordinary
formalism” to date, Charles Goetsch investigates the reasoning and beliefs of
one Simeon Baldwin, a rail road attorney, judge, and “archetypal legal
formalist” of the late nineteenth century,123 and finds that while Goetsch’s
reasoning was
from the start a jurisprudential expression of his core
conservative beliefs. . . to say that Baldwin first decided what
result he wanted to reach and then hunted around for principles
                                                
121 John H. Wigmore, Mutual Aid Societies in Old Japan, THE JAPAN
DAILY MAIL, Oct. 14, 1891.
122 Cf. Annelise Riles, Division Within the Boundaries, 4 J. ROYAL
ANTH. INST. 409 (1998).




able to ‘dictate’ that result does not adequately describe the
complexity of his decision-making process. The relationship
between his results and his principles was far more subtle and
paradoxical: when deciding cases, his result simultaneously
determined his principles, and his principles instantly dictated
his result. Thus, his results and principles both functioned as
beginning and end.124
Yet it is important to understand that Wigmore achieves this success,
in an era in which the confidence that figures such as Goetsch would have
enjoyed in the dinstinction between “beginnings” and “ends” had been shaken,
only by confounding data and audience—by stretching the notion of
univeralism outside the confines of its frame. For example, his own interest in
the legal profession in different parts of the world as a subject for comparison,
a Langdellian fragment that could stand for the whole of the legal system, is
one and the same as his interest in rendering comparative law accessible to
members of the profession, as audience. Popular (read amateuristic)
knowledge about law then serves as both the beginning and the ending point
of his work, and hence explicitly confounds beginnings and ends. It is the
logical equivalent of saying that the questions one asks about legal doctrine in
                                                
124 Id. at 251-52.
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the formalist classroom are indistinguishable from the students who answer
them.
The person and the scholarship associated with Wigmore, in other
words, demonstrates how formalism enables a particular kind of encounter
with difference—a genre of encounter that, in the realm of the comparative
disciplines, is probably unique to comparative law. Wigmore’s innovation is to
push to its limits this dimension of the formalist aesthetic—the possibility that
an infinite amount of incongruity and difference can be included within the
boundaries without threat to the coherence of the whole. His own odd
reconciliation of his progressive and conservative views and his formalist and
realist commitments serves as the ultimate example of how the formalist
structure, the universalizing frame of reference, ultimately, is not challenged




This returns us to the question of the amateurism in comparative law I
raised at the outset. The question of how to handle persons and projects that
make our amateurism explicit is a delicate one: At the conference at which this
paper was first delivered, a brisk debate erupted as to whether Wigmore could
legitimately be considered a “Master” deserving of a chapter in a book
alongside Pound, Rabel, and others. Perhaps the embarrassment stems in part
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from self-recognition: Although few comparativists today would publish
pictorial volumes with romantic titles like Panorama of the World’s Legal
Systems, to a greater or lesser extent, present day comparativists also seem
content with the incompleteness of their analysis. To date, there has been little
response to outsiders’ calls for more rigorous comparative methods other than
a sense that “that’s just not what we do.” To a modern academic, including a
comparative lawyer in modern academic mode, Wigmore’s casual refusal of
analysis seems to invite an image of scholarly laziness.
Yet a consideration of Wigmore’s life and scholarship suggests that if
amateurism is defined as a failure to analyze, then comparative law is
inherently amateuristic. It can’t be otherwise as long as our discipline remains
comparative law that is, a discipline grounded in the culture of legal
formalism, rather than comparative politics, literature, aesthetics or
anthropology. What I have tried to demonstrate in this paper for an audience
of comparativists more accustomed to thinking of their discipline as the heir to
a realist and functionalist critique of classicism, is that the formalist tradition -
- and particularly the performative formalism of the American law school
classroom -- has played a productive legitimizing and sustaining role in the
discipline, and has also been the source of much of its energry and
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creativity.125 Yet, if this is so, by way of conclusion, we must ask ourselves
why the critiques of Wigmore’s amateurism never fall upon the formalism of
his work in evidence—why the formalism that defines all legal knowledge
only looks amateuristic within the context of comparative law where the same
analytical moves serve, in other contexts, as the prototype of serious legal
scholarship.
                                                
125 What I am proposing may not appeal to today’s comparativists. In a
recent book, Alan Watson devotes a chapter to an attack on the case method in
American law schools:
When only a few [cases] are studied, each appears out of
context. The casebook does not put any of these into the
general framework of the concept . . . to give students the big
picture. Students cannot tell how far a quoted case reflects
general propositions or whether it stands at the very edge of a
doctrine. They have no way of seeing how the law builds up.
The role of authority is not clarified. . . . When a case is
discussed in isolation, it is often impossible to know which
facts are to be regarded as relevant. ALAN WATSON, LAW OUT
OF CONTEXT 141 (2000).
Watson adds that “the absence of theoretical underpinnings is a fatal
flaw in the casebook approach.” Id. at 143.
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One answer, I have tried to show, lies in the necessity of collapsing the
distinction between the performative and analytical dimensions of formalism
discussed above in order to render formalism compatible with the modernist
comparative project -- the project of comparing legal systems rather then
simply tracing the evolution of rules. Ultimately, it is this innovation, not a
contextual understanding of Japanese or American law, I think, that is the
legacy of Wigmore’s encounter with Japanese custom. 126 Wigmore’s carefree
                                                
126 Wigmore adds a personal addendum to the preface to Sources of
Ancient and Primitive Law that makes stark the relevance of his time in Japan
to the teaching mission of the volume:
Twenty-five years ago, while living in Japan, I became
interested in the sources of old Japanese law. On turning over
then unpublished materials, I discovered that its institutions,
point for point, showed parallel legal ideas, and sometimes
(amidst influences totally independent) a striking similarity of
development with the Occident. I was led to study these ideas
from the comparative point of view. As yet a novice in the
world of legal thought, I came under the fascination of what is
called comparative law (or, as it may preferably be named,
universal legal ideas). And I felt a wish and hope to cultivate
that field especially. . . . that early experience convinced me in
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performance of the life of the expatriate amateur remains his prototype of the
experience of learning, and hence his experimental model of formalism itself.
In this sense, like results and principles for the formalist Baldwin, as described
by Goetsch as quoted above, the performative and analytical dimensions of
formalism are already collapsed for Wigmore before he renders them as a
singular scholarly form.
Wigmore’s work might give the critiques of amateurism in
comparative law just a moment of pause, then. What is unique about the
“amateurism” of legal knowledge, as it has shaped comparative law into a
distinctly legal discipline, Wigmore’s work suggests, is precisely that, in its
analytical incompleteness, it leaves gaps for future analytical work. I want to
suggest that we view Wigmore as the prototype for the comparative text as a
                                                                                                                               
a personal way that the subject had a real claim upon us and a
great future,--immensely greater than the then state of the
literature might indicate.
Circumstances obstructed my wish to pursue this task, and it
was laid aside as a dream. . . . I obtrude here this personal
statement because I have a sentimental interest in thus returning
to the science of my early hopes.
John H. Wigmore, Addendum to the Preface, in KOCOUREK &
WIGMORE, supra note 49 at xi-xii.
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set of materials for collective conversation. The “open” dimension of the work
serves as a point of entry for the audience, a nexus of mutual engagement. And
yet while the notion of the experiment with the open text is as engaging as
Wigmore’s eclectic materials, Wigmore’s life and work suggests also the
limitations and the arrogance of the excitement.
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